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VOLUME IX WINTER, 1955 NUMBER 1
THE FLOW AND UNDERFLOW OF MOTL V. BOYD
THE PROBLEM
by
A. A. White* and Will Wilsont
"We are of the opinion that riparian waters are the waters of the
ordinary flow and underflow of the stream; and that the waters of the
stream, when they rise above the line of highest ordinary flow, are to be
regarded as flood waters or waters to which riparian rights do not
attach." $
W ITH this sentence, Mr. Justice Cureton attempted to estab-
lish a certain and definite boundary between the fiercely
defensive riparians and the aggressive appropriators. Did he, as
some engineers say, over-simplify nature and lay down an impos-
sible and completely unworkable rule? Or did he, like Moses, "lift
thou up thy rod, and stretch out thine hand over the sea, and divide
it" so that the courts might pass over on dry land?
Much as the subject it discussed, Motl v. Boyd has its flow and
underflow. It is the purpose of this series of articles to examine
and dissect its major conclusions, to appraise them in the light of
our present-day knowledge of Spanish and Mexican irrigation law
and practice at the time of grant, to re-examine the water rights
inherent in Spanish and Mexican grants, to label as such those
parts of its conclusions which are dicta, and to determine the areas
which are still open for consideration by the legislature and the
courts.
Certainly Judge Cureton did not put an end to controversy. In
1927, one year after the decision of Motl v. Boyd, a Texas Law
*LL.B., Southern Methodist University; Dean, University of Houston College of Law.
tB.S., University of Oklahoma; LL.B., Southern Methodist University; Associate
Justice, Texas Supreme Court.
*Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458, 468 (1926).
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Review article asserted that "At present the law is in a very
unsatisfactory state" and that the Supreme Court had "muddied
the waters."1 In 1930 a leading article in the Texas Law Review
made the statement:
* * * The existing laws are inexcusably confused and inadequate. Be-
fore industry depending upon water can develop with any security a
remedy must be had. * * *2
Some twenty seven years after Motl v. Boyd, Federal District
Judge James V. Allred (formerly Attorney General and Gov-
ernor of Texas) in a memorandum opinion, refusing federal juris-
diction in a water dispute, thus vividly stated his own opinion of
the situation:
For years it has been a matter of common knowledge that the Texas
water laws and decisions are in hopeless confusion; that even if they
are as clear as some attorneys profess to believe them, their application
and administration would be difficult for an agency clothed with ample
authority; that the present state laws, which have been on the books
without change for decades, confer little, if any, real authority upon the
State Board' of Engineers; that the Board has granted permits on many
streams in the state, very few of which have been cancelled, in such
numbers and for such quantities, that if riparian rights are given the
full effect for which plaintiffs contend, practically every drop of water,
normal flow or flood, is 'bespoken'; that this is practically true in the
Rio Grande Valley; that many studies have been made by interim
committees of the Texas Legislature, water conservation organizations,
etc.; that bills repeatedly have been introduced for a state water code
and wound up to await another study; that another such study is now
being readied. * * *3
One contributing factor to the confusion announced by Judge
Allred is the use of common law precedents, born at other times
and in other places, where the physical, social, and political factors
shaping them were substantially different from those giving rise to
current problems in Texas. A second contributing factor is the
necessity of meshing the common law with Spanish and Mexican
1 Hildebrand, Rights of Riparian Owners at Common Law in Texas, 6 TExAs L. REv.
19,29 (1927).
2 Cox, The Texas Board of Water Engineers, 8 TExAs L. REy. 238 (1930).
8 Martinez v. Maverick County Water Control and Improvement District No. 1, now
pending as No. 14891 in U.S. Ct. of App., 5th Circuit.
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civil law and customs, many of which were actually of Moorish
origin.4
The English precedents must be read with an understanding
that their central problem was the preservation of the stream flow
for the purpose of meeting the needs of their mills.' Also both
English and early American authorities must be studied with the
thought always in mind that before the advent of the railroad, the
courts conceived of the streams and canals as one of the principal
highways of transportation, and, for this purpose, it was necessary
to preserve at all times in navigable water courses a minimum
depth of water free from obstruction.' Even as far back as Magna
Charta, we find in the 22nd Chapter: " * * all weirs from hence-
forth shall be utterly put down through Thames and Medway, and
through all England, except by the sea coasts." Since both England
and the eastern half of the United States are normally well watered
by rainfall and since there was no cultural tradition for irrigated
farming, the courts were not often concerned with the need of
water for agricultural purposes.
The common law precedents prior to 1840 were decided under
these circumstances, and by judges focusing on these conditions.
At about this date there began a rapid process of development of
the whole of the western half of the United States, and for the first
time the common law of flowing waters was applied to an arid
climate. It is common knowledge that this whole territory is radi-
cally different in climate and other physical characteristics from
that prevailing in England and the eastern half of the United
States.7 But the peoples who migrated west of the Mississippi had
lived and been educated in a society of common law traditions. The
4 1 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS c. 30 (2d ed. 1912).
6 The following English cases, which include most of the principal ones decided
in that country between the dates covered by them, all involved the operation of mills:
Omerod v. Todmorden Mill Co., 11 Q.B.D. 155 (1883); Nuttall v. Bracewell, 15 L.T.
313 (Ex. 1866); Chasemore v. Richards, VII H.L. Cas. 349, 11 Eng. Rep. 140 (1859);
Miner v. Gilmour, 14 Eng. Rep. 861 (1858); Sampson v. Hoddinott, 1 C.B.N.S. 590,
140 Eng. Rep. 242 (1857); Embrey v. Owen, 6 Ex. 353, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (1851);
Wood v. Waud, 3 Ex. 748 (1849) ; Howard v. Wright, 57 Eng. Rep. 76 (1823) ; Bailey
v. Shaw, 102 Eng. Rep. 1266 (1805).
o Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARv. L. REV. 252, 263 (1936).
7Id. at 252, 255-7.
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lawyers and judges especially had been intensely trained in the
common law. Just as a glacier picks up fragmentary debris pro-
duced by its grinding action on the terrain over which it expands
and carries it hundreds of miles to deposit it eventually on a com-
pletely foreign landscape, so did the irresistible westward migra-
tion of the English stock bring with it the common law of flowing
waters to deposit it on the banks of semi-arid torrential-type
streams bearing no resemblance to the Hudson, the Medway, or
the Thames. So when water problems arose it was only natural that,
lacking familiarity with a system of law which had emerged
around the Mediterranean from circumstances, and to fill needs,
somewhat similar to those with which they were confronted, they
first fell back on the precedents of the system they knew. In some
of the states where the contrasts of climate and geography were
most pronounced, the utter futility of this approach was soon
apparent, but the choice was not so clear in a state such as Texas,
which embraces wide variations in rainfall, climate, and topog-
arphy. Even in Texas, however, it soon became apparent that the
common law must be adapted to local geography. In fact it was
soon realized that much more needed to be done to the common
law system than merely adapt it to geography! Its ingrown techni-
calities, its division into law and equity, its narrow and restricted
pleading and practice did not compare favorably with the civil
system. It has been aptly said that:
The practice under this system (Spanish Civil) appealed to the
robust common sense of the early Texas lawyers. The learning of
Chitty upon the negative pregnant and the replication de injuria were
felt to be foreign to the free spirit of the frontier. * * *9
So the Texas pioneers proceeded to adopt much of the civil law.
They combined law and equity, gave the wife one-half of the fruits
of the marriage through community property instead of dower,
plead by petition and answer, enforced by sequestration, and
exempted a homestead and the tools of trade from liability for
8 Hall, An Account of the Adoption of the Common Law by Texas, 28 TEXAS L. REV.
801,809 (1950).
9 McCormick, The Revival of the Pioneer Spirit in Texas Procedure, 18 TEXAs L
REv. 426, 428 (1940).
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debt.' ° A mingling of the civil and common law was the inevitable
product of the freshness of the pioneer approach, for:
Still another signal character of the pioneers who hewed out our pro-
cedure was their willingness to 'try all things.' Theirs was the epoch
of trial and error, theirs was the courage to experiment which is the first
necessary condition of improvement in any system of procedure. The
mingling of the common law ideas which the settlers had brought with
them and the civil law conceptions which they were required to accept
in the colonial period, and the need for making a practical compromise
between the two when independence came promoted the feeling that
there was nothing sacred and unchangeable in either system. Like all
pioneers, they borrowed many things. As Kipling says of Homer, "What
he thought he might require, he went and took.""
Although the westward migration had thrust out the Mexican
government and much of the civil law, it sheared off and left perm-
anently imbedded in Texas a great host of Spanish and Mexican
land titles 2 which, under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 1" were
required to be recognized as existing property rights 4 The Spanish
land grants were made under a land system evolving out of feudal-
ism different from that of the English. In addition, they were con-
trolled by many colonization laws, decrees, and customs. The
content of Spanish land titles in the period before 1820 was in
many respects unsettled and uncertain and depended in part upon
the currents of political movements such as that of the regalists
which sought to expand the absolute powers of the crown. From the
beginning of the Mexican rebellion until the establishment of the
Texas Republic, there existed a period of fluctuating governments
10 Hall, op. cit. supra note 8, at 801, 809.
11 McCormick, op. cit. supra note 9, at 426, 429.
12 Spanish and Mexican grants cover 26,280,000 acres in Texas. RFP. OF CoMM'N OF
GEN. LAND OFFICE (1930-1932).
1 Hoffman, Texas Land Titles and Vested Rights, 25 TExAs L. R v. 508 (1947).
14 Anderson v. Polk, 117 Tex. 73, 297 S.W. 219 (1927) ; Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex
213, 56 S.W. 2d 438 (1932).
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and near chaos.15 During this period a number of Mexican land
statutes were passed. Under the Republic of Texas all land grants
were in part metamorphized into a modified, common law fee
simple estate. 6
Section 1 of the Schedule of the Constitution of the Republic of
Texas provided that "all laws now in force in Texas, and not
inconsistent with this Constitution, shall remain in full force until
declared void, repealed, altered, or expire by their own limita-
tion.""7 In 1840 the Texas congress decreed " * * That the Com-
mon Law of England (so far as it is not inconsistent with the Con-
stitution or the Acts of Congress now in force) shall, together with
such acts be the rule of decision in this Republic, and shall con-
15 "Ardrey, for Plaintiff in error.-The form of government established after the
overthrow of the Spanish vice-royalty in Mexico was a limited monarchy, in conformity
with the plan of Iguala, and treaty of Cordova, and the Spanish monarchy was provi-
sionally adopted. The executive department of the government was administered by a
regency, of which the Generalissimo Don Augustin Iturbide was president. The govern-
ment went into operation on the 24th of February, 1821. By this revolution and the estab-
lishment of a new government, the patrimonial right of the King of Spain passed to the
new government. 1 White's Recop. 565. On the 19th of May, 1822, the provisional
congress was turned out of doors, and Iturbide was proclaimed emperor of Mexico, and
the imperial government continued until the 29th of May, 1823. 1 White's Recop. 570.
The instituent congress then provisionally organized a government, and published the
same on the 4th of October, 1824. 1 White's Recop. 410. * * " Goode v. McQueen's
Heirs, 3 Tex. 241, (1848).
10 In Spain so much property had been locked up from commerce by her system of
primogeniture and entailments (mayorazgos) that on September 27, 1820, the Cortes
passed a decree abolishing all future interests in property. The revolution which resulted
in the independence of Mexico was then in progress, but in 1823 Mexico adopted this
decree, and in 1834 the state of Coahuila and Texas recognized it as part of its law. It
remained the law of Texas until March 20, 1840, on which date the Act of January 20,
1840, adopting the 'common law of England as the rule of decision' when not inconsist-
ent with the Constitution and laws of Texas, became effective. Therefore there was no
law of future interests in property in Texas prior to March 20, 1840. Before that time
the Congress of the Republic had passed no act under which such interests could have
been created. Paragraph 17 of the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of 1836
is the only constitutional provision that affects the subsequent law of future interests,
and that only in so far as it abolished estates tail and in so far as it may affect perpetui-
ties and the Rule against Perpetuities when applied to such interests. This provision,
with changes necessarily incident to the change from a republic to a state of the Union,
appears as Section 26, Article 1 of the Constitution of 1876, and may be found in all
prior constitutions of the State.
* * * By the adoption of the common law as a rule of decision, even though it was
to be effective only in so far as it was consistent with the constitution and statutes and
what some of the Texas decisions call "the circumstances and conditions of our people,'
Texas swung from the extreme of the Spanish decree, destroying all future interests,
and took into her legal system the common law of contingent remainders that was
developed under and was still controlled by ideas of seisin that were not only never
a part of the Texas law, but were foreign to the policy of her law." Rhea, The Destruc-
tibility of Contingent Remainders in Texas, 2 TEXAS L. Rsy. 63, 67 (1923).
17 1 LAWS OF TEXAs 1077 (Gammel 1898).
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tinue in full force until altered or repealed by Congress," and
Mexican laws were repealed as of 1840 "* * * except the Laws of
the Consultation and Provisional Government, now in force, and
except such Laws as related exclusively to grants and the coloniza-
tion of lands in the State of Coahuila and Texas, and also such
Laws as relate to the reservation of Islands and Lands, and also
of Salt-Lakes, Licks and Salt Springs, Mines and Minerals of every
description; made by the General and State Governments."'" In
this situation, the necessity of defining Spanish and Mexican titles
turned the courts toward the civil law 9 in which they had little
training and skill.2 The obvious difficulties in translating into Eng-
lish and Spanish and Mexican laws and commentaries came not
only from the fact that they were written in the Spanish language
of several different centuries (and therefore some of it even then
obsolete in Spain), but also from translating terms from laws and
appraising the place of customn in a governmental and legal sys-
tem so completely alien to ours that legal concepts common to both
have many subtle differences.22 For instance, just who in the ver-
tical heirarchy of continental feudalism had control of water
rights on nonnavigable and nonfloatable streams had been in
France an uncertain and much debated point.2" In addition, con-
itnental Spanish water law and the practice of irrigation in Spain
by the complexities of the structure of its monarchy and actually
18 2 LAWS OF TEXAS 178 (Gammel 1898).
19 Act of January 20, 1840, 2 LAWS OF TEXAS 178 (Gammel 1898) ; Goode v. Mc-
Queen's Heirs, 3 Tex. 241 (1848); Sydeck v. Duran, 67 Tex. 256, 3 S.W. 264 (1887);
Allen v. West Lumber Co., 244 S.W. 499 (Com. App. 1922); Grubstake Inv. Assn. v.
State, 272 S.W. 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; Anderson v. Polk, 117 Tex. 73, 297 S.W.
219 (1927).
20 "During the period of nominal Mexican rule, these lawyers had drunk, though
not deeply, at the spring of the civil law. * * * McCormick, op. cit. supra note 9, p. 426,
427.
21 1 KINNEY, op. cit. supra note 4, c. 30.
22 "This peculiarity in the federal constitution of Mexico, and the constitution of
the state of Coahuila and Texas, has been long known, and in no new discovery of
modern research, drawn from the obscurity in which a different language from our own
had allowed it to repose. Nearly ten years ago, in a conversation on the subject of the
constitution of Mexico, in which a Mexican gentleman, who enjoys considerable reputa-
tion among his countrymen as a jurist, participated, he expressed much surprise at
what he thought an anomaly in the constitution of Texas, that it was the faculty of the
judiciary to construe, and decide on, the constitutionality of acts of congress. He was
opposed to it in principle, and believed that the constitution of Mexico had wisely
guarded against it." Goode v. McQueen's Heirs, 3 Tex. 241, 257 (1848).
23 Bordeaux, de la Legislation des Cours d'Eau et des Frais D' Ingenieur Paris,
Alphonse Delhemme, Libraire 80-82 (France 1849).
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before 1820 (the period of Spanish grants in Texas) is complicated
varied from one section of Spain to another.24
The end result of this confusion is sometimes extremely perplex-
ing. For instance, in 1932 the same judge who wrote Mott v. Boyd
in 1926 wrote the court's opinion in Manry v. Robinson.25 He held
that when a river abandons its former course the present owners
of Mexican grants riparian to the abandoned river had a right of
reverter conditioned on the Mexican law of rivers and thereby
acquired title to the river bed at the time the river changed its
course. We need not here analyze the correctness of this holding,
but a curious blending of common and civil law in the opinion pro-
duced the legal oddity of the holder of a Mexican title having, as a
part of the original grant from the Mexican government, an appur-
tenant "right of reverter" to the river bed with the state, as succes-
sor to the Mexican government, holding a "base or determinable
fee" conditioned on the river not changing its course. Although this
case was decided several years after Motl v. Boyd, we will quote at
length from it -in order to give a preview of, and to better illus-
trate, the problem and the approach to its solution we wish to
analyze in Motl v. Boyd. The court's reasoning is as follows:
1. * * * in determining the rights of holders of title under Mexican
grants, the laws of Mexico in effect when the grants were made con-
trol. * *26
2. Under the laws of Mexico in effect at the time of these grants,
the bed of the Brazos river then occupied by it was the property of the
government, and upon the change of sovereignty, became the property
of the Republic of Texas. * *27
3. When the river, however, abandoned its channel, the abandoned
bed under the laws of Mexico became the property of the owners of the
riparian or adjacent lands. * * * The insistence is made that under this
act the Mexican civil law, which vested the title to abandoned river
beds in the adjacent landowners, was repealed, and that since the river
bed in the instant case was not abandoned until 1914, the rule of the
common law should apply, and not that of the Mexican civil law. With
this view we cannot agree. 28
24 1 KINNNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, 257 (2nd ed. 1912).
25 Manry v. Robinson, 122 Tex. 213, 56 S.W. 2d 438 (1932).
26 Manry v. Robinson, 122 Tex. 213, 56 S.W. 2d 438, 442 (1932).
27 Ibid.
28 Id. at 442, 443.
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4. These rights thus embraced within the grants were sedulously
preseved to the grantees by the Constitution and laws of the Republic
of Texas. * * * Can it be doubted that the lands granted to the remote
grantors of the respondents Rosen et al., "with all their uses, customs,
privileges and appurtenances," are within these protective clauses of
the Constitution, and that any act of the Congress of the Republic
attempting to deprive the grantees of their lands, or any use, custom,
privilege, etc., embraced within their grants, would have been void?
We think not. * * *29
5. The rights of the Mexican grantees as they existed on March 2,
1836, were likewise preserved to them by the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo. Thorpe's American Charters, vol. 1, p. 389. Against the con-
clusion stated above, it is urged that the right of the riparians to succeed
to the title of a river bed upon its abandonment by the river, was not
a property right, but a mere rule of law under which a property right
would not vest until the river had actually abandoned its bed; and
therefore not within the exceptions to the repealing provisions of the
act of 1840 (2 Gammel's Laws p. 178), nor the protective clauses above
cited from the Constitutions of the Republic and state. With that insist-
ence we cannot agree. It is true that the avulsive change by which the
bed of the river was abandoned did not occur until 1914, but we think
the right of the riparians to succeed the state in title to the river bed
by reason of such occurrence was a vested one, part of the original
grants when they were made by the government of Mexico, just as were
the rights to alluvion by accretion and adjacent soil uncovered by
reliction. 0
Having decided that Mexican laws, uses and customs of the
time of grant became a part of the grant but recognizing the diffi-
culties of treating the Mexican laws as laws if in fact they had
not been repealed, and recognizing that Mexican customs no longer
had any force as such, the court attempted to translate the result
into an estate in land defined by common law terminology. 1 The
court said:
In the instant case, under the civil law, the state, as the successor in
title to the Republic of Mexico to the land involved, so long as the
Brazos River occupied it, held same under a title within the definition
29 d. at 443.
30 Ibid.
81 This is not an altogether new legal problem. For river-bed cases in New York,
involving the imposition of the common law upon a Dutch civil law base, see Smith
v. Rochester, 92 N. Y. 463 (1883) ; People v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N. Y. 461 (1865);
People v. Page, 56 N. Y. Supp. 834 (1899).
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of a base or determinable fee; that is, its title, while an estate in fee,
was in fact a base or qualified one, determinable in favor of the ripar-
ians upon the abandonment of the bed by the river. Kent's Commen-
taries (13th Ed.) Vol. 4, p. 8; Cooley Blackstone (3d Ed.) vol. 1, p.
385; Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160,
173, 254 S.W. 290, 29 A.L.R. 566.
We are therefore of the opinion that the right of the riparians to
succeed to the title of the abandoned bed of the river here involved is,
and was, a property right, within the exceptions to the repealing act
of 1840, and within the protection of the due process clauses of our
several Constitutions, and of the provisions of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo.
Under the Mexican civil law, by which we believe we must be gov-
erned, the land in controversy does not belong to the state, but to the
holders of title under the original Mexican grants. * * *82
The effect of such a decision is to freeze into land titles Mexican
laws and customs which were themselves subject to amendment
and change under the Mexican government. If this transformation
is valid, such Mexican laws and customs acquire a stature, under
due process far superior to that accorded them in the land of their
origin. In this fashion, Judge Cureton poured old Spanish wine
into an ancient English bottle and corked it good and tight with
American due process.
Therefore, after the passing of the pioneer generation, the
question arises whether or not some lawyers and judges, when
confronted with a civil law question do not have even less sure-
ness in handling its content than the pioneers had. Lacking a real
basis of civil law scholarship upon which to appraise the correct-
ness of their interpretation or any familiarity with the actual
practice of civil law upon which to evaluate their sources, and,
lacking enough knowledge of comparative law to be able to move
freely from one legal system to another, they seem to have lost the
freshness of the pioneer search for substance rather than form.
It is not surprising to find confusion growing as the years pass.
Out of such a setting, and in 1926, came Mod v. Boyd. The
case arose from a conflict between upper and lower riparian irriga-
82 Manry v. Robinson, 122 Tex. 213, 56 S.W. 2d 438, 445 (1932).
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tors on a torrential-type stream flowing through land granted after
statehood in a semi-arid part of the state. 8 It is without doubt
one of the definitive opinions in Texas on the law of flowing
waters. That it is the product of much reading is beyond question.
That it is a major contribution to the legal literature on the sub-
ject is the claim of the ardent riparians. That its major conclusions
are debatable is established at each session of the Texas Legisla-
ture and at every water meeting. For our purposes, some of the
major conclusions discussed in Motl v. Boyd may be listed as:
1. All riparian lands in Texas granted prior to 1895, whether from
Spain, Mexico, or Texas, carried as a part of the grant a vested prop-
erty right to the waters of the stream to be used for irrigation.8 4
2. The tile to stream waters is in the State in trust for the public:
first, for navigation; second, the riparian waters are in trust for the
riparian owners; third, nonriparian waters are in trust for the best
interest of all the people. A statutory appropriation grants no property
rights in the water but is a mere license to use it for statutory purposes.3 5
3. Riparian righs attach to the ordinary flow and underflow but not
to flood waters.86
4. An oral, gratuitous permission to construct a dam and irrigation
88 A fuller statement of the facts is: in 1886 one Nasworthy owned a farm, riparian
to Spring Creek, a navigable stream. In that year one Lackey contracted to buy the farm
if he could arrange for water to irrigate it. This arrangement was made by Lackey with
one Lee who owned 160 acres, patented by the State to his remote grantor in 1857,
lying riparian to Spring Creek some four miles above the first tract. Lee gratuitiously
authorized Lackey to construct an impounding dam on his farm and the necessary head-
gate and irrigation ditch to convey the water to the Lackey farm. This Lackey did and
he and his successors in title, the Mots being the last, openly and continuously used
the water so impounded to irrigate their farm for a period of 35 years. Spring Creek
carried storm waters and near continuous flow from springs. The dam impounded both
and both were used for irrigation. In 1889 the then irrigator of the Lackey farm filed
the affidavit necessary to comply with the Irrigation Act of that year. No issue of any
kind arose until the year 1920 when R. W. Boyd and H. C. White purchased the 160-
acre tract on which the dam was located. This purchase was made with full knowledge
of the presence of the dam and the use being made of it by the Motls. Boyd and White
made a preliminary effort to get the permission of the Mots to pump water from the
supply behind the dam, which effort was not followed through, and sought from, and
were denied by, the Board of Waters Engineers permission to appropriate "Storm"
waters from the same source. They then installed a pump and began drawing water
from behind the dam to irrigate portions of their 160 acres. The Motls sought and
obtained a temporary injunction against them and on a failure of the court to dissolve
on motion, Boyd and White appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial
court and a writ of error was granted by the Supreme Court. Mod v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82,
286 S.W. 458 (1926).
84 286 S.W. at 467.




ditch upon upper riparian land in order to supply water to a lower
riparian, plus thirty years open and continuous use and maintenance of
such dam and ditch estopped the upper riparian from questioning the
right to continue such practices and in effect constituted a grant by
the upper to the lower riparian. 87
These conclusions fall far short of settling all the controversies
which arise between riparians and appropriators. With them,
especially numbers one and four, we shall deal extensively in
subsequent papers. Before doing so, however, it is believed that
it will be helpful to further develop the legal and factual back-
ground materials. In attempting a survey of water cases and
statutes, one will find at once that, though there may be an acute
shortage of water, there is no shortage of controversy about water
law. Before proceeding far, the most perplexing and puzzling
legal dilemmas will beset him.
The charge has often been made that it is neither the lack of
water nor the lack of capital which holds back the development
of irrigation as a standard farming procedure, but the lack of
workable and intelligent laws.88 But the formulation of workable
laws is made difficult by many factors in addition to the common
law-civil law problem hereinabove discussed. Consider first the
hydrological cycle.
Water gains height when the sun's energy causes the ocean to
vaporize and ascend to form a cloud. That part which upon con-
densation falls to the earth flows back under the pull of gravity
87 286 S.W. at 476.
88 "Yet, at first blush, strangely the problem was not one of engineering nor yet one of
money-but one of law. Local regulations of voluntary mining districts that might do
for miners could not suffice. The first task was the legal delimination of rights in water
and legal protection, and more encouragement of user of water. California muffed the
issue, and for seventy odd years has been playing hide and seek through many-paged
reports to the utter mystification of the legal profession, the paralyzation of agriculture
and the discouragement of the farmer." Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic
Distribution of Water by the State-via Irrigation Administration, 1 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
161, 164 (1929); Mead, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS, Vi (1910) ; Hall, IRRIGATION DEVEL-
OPMENT, 5ff (1886) ; " * * It is not surprising that, in this growth, the rate of physi-
cal construction exceeded the rate at which we have developed the governmental policies
and the public agencies for the control of our water projects. Engineers have met the
problems of design and construction, larger and larger sources of finances have become
available, but a clear picture of the objectives the water projects are to serve and how
such objectives can best be achieved is still lacking." Harding, Background of Cali-
fornia Water and Power Problems, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 547f (1950).
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toward the ocean, losing head 9 (or height) as it goes. The name
given to this great round trip is the hydrological cycle. It is one
of nature's many circulatory systems. It might be called a conti-
nental blood stream in that its failure brings death and the desert,
its excesses produce floods and disaster, while its smooth and even
flow both sustains life, and, again like a blood stream, carries
away refuse. A continuing flow sustains the bacterial action by
which a stream cleanses itself and the watershed which it drains.
Stagnation brings ill health and may bring eventual ruin. This
hydrological cycle has been judicially recognized as the life blood
of a state.40 From early times, the prosperity and health of many
peoples has depended upon their ability to manage and use the
available water supply while at the same time keeping the streams
flowing.4'
Consider next the governmental situation.
In the management of its water supply, each nation has sought
a solution consistent with the liberty and freedom it accords to
its people. At one extreme might be an absolutist system of total
government ownership of all water and complete legislative or
administrative control of its distribution. This is characteristic
of authoritative states and was attempted in the past by several
monarchies in Western Europe. It is difficult for possessory prop-
erty rights to exist in such states, but, under the absolutist gov-
ernments of both France and Spain in the period when they may
have influenced Texas law, there seems to have been possessory
rights originating in royal grant or charter.
89 Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 80 HARv. L REv. 252, 261 (1936).
40 Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 22 P. 2d 5 (Cal. 1933).
41 ,,* * At the time that Moses appeared to lead the Children of Israel out of
bondage from Egypt, it is certain that (irrigation) was known and practiced in that
country. And, as one of the inducements for their continuing their journey, it was
promised them in the following language: 'For the land, whither thou goest in to possess
it, it is not as the land of Egypt, from whence ye came out, where thou sowest thy seed,
and wateredst it with thy foot, as a garden of herbs. But the land whither ye go to
possess it, is a land of hills and valleys, and drinketh of the rain of heaven.' The watering
of the land with the foot undoubtedly referred to some appliance for lifting the water
from a stream or well to pour it into the ditches, and a similar contrivance worked by
the Fellahin can be found in some parts of Egypt today. It is evident that Moses did
not think much of this method of cultivating the land." 1 KINNEY, IRRIeATION AND
WATER RIGHTS, 104 (1912). See p. 103 et seq.
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On the other extreme might be a situation where all flowing
water is the subject of individual property rights protected by and
bottomed on a due process concept. Although England developed
a system in which property rights predominated, yet navigable
rivers were administered under the conservancy for centuries,"'
and Parliament seems to have been able legislatively to control
the disposition of flowing streams.4" Under a pure property right
system, there can be little governmental control other than that
involved in the arbitration of property conflicts. This is usually
accomplished in lawsuits between individual property owners. The
power of the legislature to control the storage and distribution
of water is severely curtailed by the protection given property
rights in flowing waters by due process. This system once resulted
in an engineer's charge against the courts that "organized selfish-
ness is more potent than unorganized consideration for the public
interest."' 4 Some of the inherent limitations of an adversary
judicial system leaves some basis for the charge. It is certainly
true that since the original source of water power is the interplay
between the sun's energy and the pull of gravity, and since the
entire cycle must be kept in motion to sustain life, most water law
problems do have aspects usually referred to in legal writing
as public and correlative."5
Between these two extremes-pure property right and pure
government ownership and administration-lies the solution gen-
42 CoULSoN AND FORBES, LAw OF WATERS, (4th Ed. 1924) p. 490.
43 Proprietors of River Medway v. Romney, 142 Eng. Rep. 226 (1861).
44 ,* * * Organized selfishness is more potent than unorganized consideration for
the public interests. The appropriator has been in court in person and by attorney. The
rights of the water-user apart from the ditch-owner have seldom been considered. Hence
it is coming to be, that rights to running water are ceasing to conform to the require-
ments of any use, are being separated from any place of diversion or application, and
are being bought and sold and leased like land or livestock or any other property."
MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS, p. 87 (1910); "* * * Sometimes these lawsuits take
the form of injunctions, sometimes equitable actions to determine the respective rights
of appropriators or to quiet titles. But whatever their form, they all have,one thing
in common: they are waged as though the issue were purely a private matter, and the
disposal of the rains and snows that make streams were something in which the public
has no concern. There is no disinterested or public measurement of the ditches and
streams or of the lands irrigated. The testimony submitted is often inaccurate and
contradictory, but it is all the judge has on which to base his decree. Even the govern-
ment, as the owner of large areas of land requiring irrigation, is never a party to these
suits, itor is the State, although nothing so vitally concerns the public welfare as the
establishment of ownership or control over streams. * * *" MEA, Id. at 80.
4f Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARv. L. REv. 252, 274-282 (1936).
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erally achieved in modern times by most Western European and
North American nations. The property right cases early began
to reflect situations where a group of owners entered into an
administrative agreement for the purpose of making their prop.
erty rights effective.46 Some of our states, principally those in the
arid and semi-arid regions of the United States, have moved from
property rights toward governmental control, if not outright gov-
ernmental ownership.47 This movement brings on an immediate'
conflict with "due process"4 and raises very difficult questions49
of just how far property rights can be impaired without constitut-
ing a "taking" requiring payment of compensation." This requires
a careful analysis of riparian rights to determine to what extent
they are subject to change by legislation.
Of course, the actual system established by any state or nation
4s "As soon as use of water from a stream approaches the amount of the available
supply, a system of administration is required that each user may receive the water to
which he is entitled at the time he has need for its use. * * " Harding, Background
of California Water and Power Problems, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 545, 554 (1950) ; Hutchins,
Selected Problems In the Law of Water Rights in the West, U.S.D.A. Misc. Pun. 418;
Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 Fed. Cases 472, 4 Mason 397 (1827).
47 Mead, supra note 38, Hutchins, supra note 46, c. 2.
48 Hutchins, supra note 46, at 32.
49 ,* * * State action infringing property rights can be upheld under the Federal
Constitution only if its objective is one which can be justified as in the general welfare,
and if the action taken has a real and substantial relation to its justifying objective,
not amounting to an arbitrary invasion of individual rights. Riparian rights may
be divested for public use under this doctrine, and apparent acquiesence to the taking
may waive the riparian's right to compensation for the loss. A 'preponderant public
interest' will justify even the destruction of individual property without recourse to
the doctrine of nuisance, and state action reasonable inuring to the conservation of
natural resources does not violate due process. But under the guise of public interest
in the conservation of natural resources, a state may not take one individual's property
and give it to another." Boone, Stale Claims in Texas Stream Waters, 28 TEXAs L.
REv. 931, 932 (1950).
50 "* * * If the sovereign engages in the business of selling land, it should observe
honest business principles. On the other hand, these decisions must be read with an
awareness that the police power to take property without compensation has in the last
several decades undergone great extension. It is not to be doubted, for instance, that
cities may by zoning ordinances restrict an area to residential use in spite of the fact
that there were no such restrictions when the land was patented. It is believed that
any change in the principles of the cases herein discussed will be in the direction of
using the police power to cut into rights that are not already clearly established as
incorporeal hereditaments. The use of this principle to sustain legislative action may
be observed in the cases discussed above dealing with the right of a landowner to pro-
tect himself by diverting surface water from flowing onto his land.
"The writer is of the opinion that there should be a limit to the extent to which we
rigorously bind ourselves to apply, through the vested rights doctrine, the laws of
ancient governments which in some cases may be inapplicable to modern conditions.
If this view is accepted, then the increased invocation of the police power in this
field will not be undesirable. * * " HOFFMAN, Texas Land Titles and Vested Rights,
25 TF.xAs L. REv. 508, 528 (1947).
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is a reflection of the balance it strikes between the competing
values inherent in the two opposing systems and, like everything
else, changes with changing conditions and with the thinking of
the people. It is not difficult to trace in some of our western states,
originally operating under a pure property right system, the rapid
development from completely unsupervised freedom to regulated
sharing. The history of these states clearly demonstrates the
growth of governmental supervision from a simple recording-of-
claims beginning."
As always, property rights serve as both a brake on absolutism
and at the same time as an impediment to comprehensive plan-
ning and complete engineering efficiency. Since the task of pro-
tecting property rights falls on the courts, this impediment-to-
planning aspect of property rights in water has emphasized the
differences between lawyers and engineers" and has often
brought on a conflict between water engineers and the courts.58
Much of the water legislation of the last seventy-five years has
been drafted originally by administrators for the express purpose
of circumventing lawyers and the courts." In some states the
engineers have at least partially succeeded in erecting a barricade
between their management of the storage and distribution of water
and the court's concern over individual property rights.55
51 "As interest in water becomes greater, increasing control is necessary. Local
bodies are at first charged only with regulatory duties; and adjudication of water rights
is possible only in private litigation between contesting parties when controversies
become serious. Then centralized control varying in form, develops."
Cox, The Texas Board of Water Engineers, 8 TEXAS L. REV. 238, 239 (1930).
52 "* * * The hope of engineers--a comprehensive, scientific plan of development
and conservation, with an adjustment of uses in some order of economic merit unham-
pered by technical vested rights of little public advantage-is still a pious hope only;
but at least a beginning of the passage from the chaos of casual individual initiative
and insistent competing claims will soon be made. * * " Bingham, Some Suggestions
Concerning the California Law of Riparian Rights, LEGAL ESSAYS.
58 " * * It is the concensus of engineering opinion that the law of irrigation has not
kept step with the progress made by the irrigator and the engineer through some half
century of experience in diverting and applying the waters of the state to beneficial
uses. It is intimated, when it is not directly so charged, that the legal profession, with
its inherent conservatism, its traditional adherence to precedence, its overemphasis
on the sanctity of private porperty rights, its jealousy of interference with individual
action, its fear of a socialistic trend in the body politic, has become an obstruction to
the scientific solution of some of the problems which must be solved if Colorado's
irrigation laws are to permit the potential development of its water supplj,. And there
is some merit in this contention." McHendrie, The Evolution of the Doctrine of
Priority of Water Rights, 33 Covo. BAR ASS'N, 126 (1901).




The question of which system provides the greatest social and
economic good5" has been debated in scores of cases and there
has long been agitation, especially from engineers, for the curtail-
ment of all property rights in water and substitution of a license
system under state control. 7 It has been said that even though the
engineers wished to take the water out of the courts and into their
hands still "It should not be too much to ask that the efficiency of
engineers subordinate itself willingly to the impartiality to which
the courts are sworn, and to which no one else is sworn. Knowledge
of that impartiality, far more than efficiency, is the cornerstone of
public peace and prosperity," and "In another way of saying it,
public confidence in justice is better than new investments without
it; and a good name is better than great riches."5"
So consider next the property right situation.
Both legislative and judicial attempts to engraft workable
property concepts upon the hydrological cycle have encountered
what initially appear to be insuperable difficulties. The first of
these is caused by the physical fact that water in its natural state
is in constant motion and is not subject to branding or other iden-
56 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 75 Law Ed. 602 (1931); New
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 75 Law Ed. 1104 (1931) ; Kansas v Colorado, 206
U.S. 46, 51 Law Ed. 957 (1907). Some would make the division in terms of "The
greatest good to the greatest number," while others would divide water in terms of a
balancing of equities. Still others want a basis of seniority and priority of property
rights. As one writer states it: "The problem facing the settlers of the West was,
simply and shortly, the problem facing water users everywhere throughout the world
(except in the few humid regions)-to apply a limited quantity of available water to
an unlimited quantity of available land in the hands of a constantly increasing number
of people to get the maximum of benefit and good to the maximum of people, the com-
munity as a whole." Lasky, Irrigation Administration, 1 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 161, 163
(1929). See also Burch, Conflicting Interests of States Over Interstate Wvaters, 10
TENN. L. REv. 267 (1932).
57 "As the demands upon the water-supply have grown, necessity has led to a gradual
decrease in the freedom of the appropriator and an increase in the control exercised
by the public authorities. This change has been so gradual that the legislatures of
Wyoming and Nebraska have in effect abandoned the doctrine of appropriation, although
retaining the word in their statutes. The person wishing to use water must secure a
permit from a board of State officials, and the right acquired is not governed by the
appropriator's claim, but by the license for the diversion issued by the State authorities.
This tendency toward public supervision is manifest in the other arid States, and it
seems only a question of time when the doctrine of appropriation will give way to
complete public supervision. * * *"
58 Wiel, Administrative Finality, 38 HARV. L. Rav. 447, 475, 476 (1925).
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tification.59 The second immediate property-conceptual difficulty
comes with the effort to reconcile the conflicting needs for the
consumption of water by industry, by agriculture, and by munici-
palities. All of these in turn have to be reconciled with the need
for a continuous stream flow. Then, to complicate the matter,
the hydro-electric power projects regulate flow from big reser-
voirs through their turbines so that peak water flow is at peak
power demand. This may fall during a season of little need by
water consumers, and conversely a high period of water consump-
tion may come at a low period of power demand. Thus the power
company or river authority may be raising the level of its lakes
and releasing only a small flow of water at a season when the
downstream irrigator is desperate for water, and conversely at
another time of the year the power interest may release a large
flow when the irrigator has no need at all. And in the last few
years the flood control program has raised the necessity for main-
taining sufficient empty reservoir capacity to catch and hold tempo-
rarily a flood. This causes the release of stored water in order
to have empty reservoir capacity, and this may come at a time
when there is little need for power and no use for the water. An-
other complicating factor is the necessity of having sufficient flow
at the mouth of a stream to hold back the intrusion of salt water.
This problem is especially acute where large cities or industries
adversely affected by salt water encroachment are located at the
mouth of rivers. It has been aptly said that:
* * * Every phase of water litigation and water administration is
so interlocked with every other phase that no one problem may be
59 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46; 51 Law Ed. 957 (1907) "* * * In Callis on
Sewers,--which has always been held to be a high authority upon these matters,--p. 78
(orig. edit.), the learned author says: 'It may here, as I take it, be moved for an apt
question, in whom the property of running waters was; * * * In my conceit, the Civil
law makes prettier and neater distinctions of these than our common law doth; for, there
it is said that natural ratione quaedam sunt commuia, ut aer, aqua profluens, mare, et
littora maris. I concur in opinion with them, that the air is common to all; and I hold
my former definitions touching the properties of the sea and the sea-shores. But that
there should be a property fixed in running waters, I cannot be drawn to that opinion;
for, the Civil law saith farther, quod flumen est ut ad mare tandem perveniat; for, in
my opinion, it should be strange the law of property should be fixed upon such uncer-
tainties as to be altered into meum, tuum, suum, before these words can be spoken,
and to be changed in every twinkling of an eye, and to be more uncertain in the pro-
prietor than a cameleon of his colours." Medway River Navigation Co. v. Romney,
142 Eng. Rep. 226, 231 (1861); see also Woodbridge, Rights of States in Natural
Resources, 5 S.C.L.Q. 130 (1952).
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segregated; and any administrative-judicial adjudgment stopping short
of an authoriative consideration of all the porblems, factual, legal, and
administrative, concerning each system of water supply as a whole,
must necessarily be barren of results.6 0
From this it is not hard to foresee the procedural, jurisdic-
tional and property problems in defining, adjudicating, and
administering correlative rights and public duties on the course
of a long river among such a great variety of conflicting claims
and usages. The difficulty in the resolution of these conflicting
claims is further aggravated in Texas, and several of the other
states of the country, by the necessity of reconciling these claims
when presented by adversaries claiming under opposing theories61
of water rights, namely riparian and appropriative, which, as we
shall demonstrate later, are often basically in conflict.6"
The word riparian is a derivative of the Latin word, ripa, mean-
ing river bank and is used to encompass all the rights which
belong to land adjacent to a stream bank." In general, appropria-
tive rights are possessory property rights not originating in land
ownership.
Riparian rights or privileges are universally considered to be
a usufruct"' incident to the title to land lying adjacent to or
6o Cox, The Texas Board of Water Engineers, 8 TEXAS L. Ray. 238, 239 (1930).
61 While it is perhaps accurate to say that there are only two basic theories involved,
there is a third, namely, a reasonable use, which is regarded by some as a variation of
the original riparian doctrine but by others as a doctrine sui generis. See Scurlock,
Constitutionality of Water Rights Regulation, 1 KAN. L. REV. 125, 127 (1953) ; Kinyon,
What Can a Riparian Do?, 21 MINN. L. REv. 512 (1937).
62 "* * * it may be said that the 1928 amendment to the constitution was the culmi-
nation of a long struggle between the common law riparian rights philosophy and the
miners' custom of appropriation. * * * Where other western states rejected riparian
rights, California courts spent many decades trying to reconcile the two conflicting
philosophies. * * * " Treadwell, Developing a New Philosophy of Water Rights, 38
CALIF. L. REv. 572 (1950). Hildebrand, Rights of Riparian Owners at Common Law in
Texas, 6 TExAs L. Ray. 19 (1927).
63 Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Abbott, 76 P. 2d 188, 191 (1938);
Bathgate v. Iovine, 58 Pac. 442, 445 (1899).
84 It is interesting to note that in the Code Napoleon water rights in streams are
under the chapter on Servitudes.
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under a water course."5 Thus the riparian doctrine presupposes a
subdivision of the land. It originated in Europe where the land
had been subdivided from time immemorial. The running water
itself is not, generally speaking, the subject of property,6 for
"The abstraction of a measure of water from a flowing stream
today, can give no property in water which may possibly here-
after form part of the stream, but which is now on the mountains.
The present reception of light by a window cannot give a pros-
pective property in the light itself, which will pass through the
window tomorrow, and which has not yet emanated from the
sun."
67
Appropriative rights are often said to have been introduced into
our law by the California Forty-niners,6" but the claim has also
65 "Riparian rights arise out of the ownership of land through or by which a stream
of water flows, which rights cannot extend beyond the original survey as granted by the
government. 2 FARN. ON WATERS, 1572, § 463a; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac.
674; Boehmer v. Big Rock Irr. Dist., 117 Cal. 27, 48 Pac. 908 (1897). The rule is well
expressed by this language: 'The most satisfactory rule is that the parcels of land
should be regarded as riparian as far as their location with reference to the stream
has indicated where their boundary should be fixed, so that all that parcel which is
regarded as one tract should be regarded as riparian, leaving the question of the extent
of the use which may be made of the water to the rules regulating the relative rights
of owners on the stream'. Under this rule the boundary of riparian land is restricted to
land the title to which is acquired by one transaction." Watkins Land Co. v. Clements,
98 Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733, 735. See also, Hutchins, op. cit. supra note 46 at p. 27;
COULSON AND FORCES, LAW OF WATERS, (4th Ed. 1926) pp. 74, 76; Tyler v. Wilkinson,
4 Mason 397, 24 FED. CASES 472 (1827) ; one exception is in certain situations which
arise from the subdivision of a tract originally riparian where riparian rights are
retained in a back tract. See note: 35 CALIF. L. REV. 603 (1947).
66 Ormerod v. Todmorden Mill Co., 11 Q.B.D. 155 (1883) ; Embry v. Owen, 6 Ex.
369 (1851) ; 28 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND, p. 358.
67 GALE, ON EASEMENTS 217 (6th Ed.)
68 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 66 L. ED. 999 (1921) ; United States v. Rio
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 43 L. En. 1136 (1898) ; Sturr v. Beck, 133
U.S. 470, 33 L. ED. 761 (1889) ; Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Co., 101 U.S. 274,
25 L. ED. 790 (1879) ; Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 462, 25 L. ED. 240 (1878); Basey v.
Gallagher, 20 Wall 670, 22 L. En. 452 (1874) ; Atchison v. Peterson, 20 Wall 507, 22
L. ED. 414 (1874) ; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 674 (1886) ; Williams v. Mor-
land, 107 ENG. REP. 620 (1824). "There were developed in California several new
brands of law designed to meet new conditions, all of an extremely summary character,
and in their enforcement attended with considerable mortality. The miners' law and
lynch law were supreme in the community, and while they were brief and crude they
nevertheless contained the germ and spirit of justice as completely as the more elabor-
ate codes of highly organized society. Here was a virgin country of which the general
government was virtually sole proprietor, but the authorities at Washington laid no
hand upon those who were ravishing the soil; in fact, they investigated the find, re-
ported its richness and encouraged emigration." Rogers, The Law of New Conditions,
24 A.B.A. REP. 383 (1901). See also Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARV. L. Ray.
252 (1936) ; Wiel, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES, c. 5 (1911) ; Craig, Prescrip-
tive Water Rights in California and the Necessity for a Valid Statutory Appropriation,
42 CALIF. L. REv. 219 (1954).
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been made that Colorado and Wyoming originated the doctrine, 9
and the Mormons in Utah early developed a combination adminis-
trative and property right irrigation system for delivering water
to lands not bordering on a stream.70 It has been indicated that
appropriative rights as we know them originated in the Spanish
and Mexican law and particularly the law of the Pueblos.' It is
also contended that a comparable doctrine emerged very early
in the comomn law based upon prescription.72 Perhaps Black-
stone had the correct label for the approriation system when he
said that title by occupancy is "the original and only primitive
method of acquiring any property at all."7 "
The appropriation doctrine is but another manifestation of
the squatter's right spirit of the American pioneer. It is, in fact,
but one means of obtaining a conveyance from the government.
There is a split in the development of appropriative rights be-
tween California and a number of other western states.7 4 The
Colorado doctrine emerged denying the existence of riparian
69 "Finally, be it noted that this study is organized around Colorado and Wyoming
as focal points, with assimilations and comparisons from the other states. California,
however, is rarely mentioned, and little considered. This has been done because Colorado
and Wyoming have been the pathbreakers, and the other states have developed their
law as combinations or permutations of the systems of those two states." Lasky, From
Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by the State--via Irrigation
Administration. 1 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 161, 163 (1929).
70
"Thus there was presented in the desert a necessity for the use of water identically
the same as that contemporaneously existing on the Pacfic slope. The evolution of the
law of waters in both sections occurred simultaneously, but without any mutual assist-
ance. New York and Manilla are not so far removed from each other in communication
today as Salt Lake City and the gold diggings were then, and there consequently was
no opportunity for an exchange of views or precedents. By that curious coincidence
in anthropology which enables us to find in Central Asia implements of stone, the
same in form and use as those found in Arizona, thus indicating a similar stage of
progress, we find that the condition in Utah spontaneously bred the same legal con-
ception of the right to water that prevailed in California. In both localities the founda-
tion of the right was the application of the water to beneficial uses. While the one
winnowed the golden sand, the other winnowed the golden grain. The harvest of gold is
nearly gathered; that of the grain and the other products of the soil continues in ever-
increasing volume-so that today this new law of waters is invoked almost exclusively
by the needs of agriculture." Rogers, op. cit. supra note 68, at 386.
71 1 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, 989-998 (2nd Ed. 1912).
72 Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 674 (1886) ; WIEL, WATER RIcHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES, C. 5 (1911) ; Craig, Prescriptive Water Rights in Califonia, 42 CALIF.
L. REV. 219 (1954); Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARV. L. REV. 252 (1936).
73 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 400.
74 Hutchins, op. cit. supra note 46, at 31; Trelease, Coordination of Riparian and
Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water, 33 TEXAs L. REV. 24 (1954).
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rights on the ground that the common law was not applicable "in
a dry and thirsty land"75 because of difference in geography and
climate." Under the Colorado doctrine water rights are based
upon appropriations and this even though the adjacent land may
have been previously granted to private ownership." The right
to appropriate water without owning land7" spread to the other
western states and in 1889 the legislature established it in Texas
as a second great source of water rights. 9 The right to appro-
priate water in Texas is not necessarily an incident of land owner-
ship."0 In Texas, just as in California, the statutory provisions for
appropriation did not displace the riparian doctrine but was
superimposed upon it.
The appropriation doctrine might be said to put a premium
upon arriving early upon a pioneer landscape, but so did the
original granting of riparian land, and for most of the present
75 Yunkers v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553 (1872).
70 Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 338, 53 L. ED. 822 (1909). "Indeed,
in practical operation, it has long since been discovered that in this arid country the
rule of the common law is reversed in that here the water is the principal thing and the
land the incident." Rogers, The Law of New Conditions, 24 A.B.A. REP. 376, 390 (1901).
77 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-7 (1882) ; Wiel, op. cit. supra note
72, at 252; Hutchins, op. cit. supra note 46, at 84-6.
78 Consider the following criticism of the practice in some western states of not
uniting the right to flowing water with some type of land ownership:
"* * * The history of all irrigated countries shows the necessity of uniting with
the soil the right to the water which reclaims it. Under our land system the ownership
of these joint agents of production is divorced at the outset. Title to water comes
from each of the several States. No right to water goes with a land patent. Each arid
State has different laws governing water rights, and in only two is there legislation
which favors the attachment of these rights to the soil.
"In arid countries water rights are of more importance than land titles. Without
water, the land has little value. Wherever water and land are owned apart from each
other, there is a tendency to create monopolies in water, and to place the tiller of the
soil at the mercy of the owner of the stream. The natural, if not inevitable, result of
our land system is to create such separate ownership and such speculative abuses. No
industrial problem of the West equals this in importance. * * *"
"* * * No adequate system of irrigation laws, or any enduring prosperity for the
people who till the soil, can be built on separate ownership and divided control of land
and water. The fundamental condition of success is that these two joint agents of
production should be disposed of together, and that with every title to irrigable land
should go an interest in the stream which gives it value." MEAD, IIGATION INSTITU.
TIONS, pp. 22, 23 (1910).
79 9 LAws OF TEXAS 1128 (Gammel 1889).
80 Arts. 7470, 7471, 7473, 7493, TEX. Ra,. Civ. STATs. However, an appropriation
once established may become a hereditament appurtenant to the land for the benefit
of which the appropriation was made. Lakeside Irrigation Co. v. Markham, 116 Tex. 65,
285 S.W. 593 (1926).
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'generation both types of property in water rights are acquired
by assignment or inheritance. The Colorado doctrine is called
totalitarian,8' and it does totally abrogate the riparians. In turn,
the riparians are charged with being obstructionists, 2 with sub-
stituting accident for rule,88 of being "vicious" in a semi-arid
state which needs to live and grow, 4 and with benefiting most the
men, at the junction of the river and the sea. 5 Likewise, it is
charged against the appropriator that "The practical application
of the doctrine of priority of appropriation is admittedly unscien-
tific and unsound in securing the ultimate objective-to-wit, the
greatest beneficial use of a limited resource."86 And the outright
proponents of government ownership and control of all water
have long been vigorously criticizing the appropriation doctrine.
In 1903, Mead said:
The whole principle is wrong. It is wrong in principle as well as
faulty in procedure. It assumes that the establishment of titles to the
snows on the mountains and the rains falling on the public land and the
water collected in the lakes and rivers, on the use of which the develop-
ment of the state in a great measure depends, is a private matter. It
ignores public interests in a resource upon which the enduring pros-
perity of the community must rest. It is like A suing B for control of
property which belongs to C. Many able attorneys hold that these
decreed rights will in time be held invalid because when they were estab-
lished the public, the real owner of the property, did not have its day
in court.8 7
81 Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARv. L. REV. 252, 292 (1936).
82 "The problem, stated in a broad way, is the desire that the most extensive use
practicable be made of the waters of the state. The obstacle in the way is the claim that
a riparian owner is entitled to the full flow of the stream past his land, at least so far
as it is in any way beneficial to him, no matter how extravagant and wasteful his use
or enjoyment of the water may be, and although it may result in a very low duty being
achieved by the water before it is ultimately lost in the sea.
"The obstacle, therefore, is not the general existence of riparian rights, but the
existence of this particular incident of riparian rights. This distinction is most funda-
mental and important, because there seems to be no reason or well founded desire of
any one to take away, even by condemnation, the amount of water which riparian land
reasonably needs for its irrigation by such ordinary means as are customary in the
state. To destroy or even condemn such rights would be, first, economically undesirable,
and, second, practically impossible. This distinction would be carefully observed * *
Treadwell, Modernizing the Water Law, 17 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1928).
83 Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339, 53 L. Ed. 822, 826 (1908).
84 Waldo, Evaluation of California Water Right Law, 18 So. CALIF. L. REv. 267
(1945).
85 Note, 23 CALIF. L. Ray. 540.
88 McHendrie, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Priority of Water Rights, 33 COLO.
BAR AssN. 129 (1901).
87 MEAD, IRRIcATION INSTITUTIONS, p. 207 (1903).
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Because riparian rights to a continuous flow may be lost by
prescription a lower riparian formerly had the duty of initiating
action to prevent an upstream unauthorized diversion of the flow,
and this even though he had no present use for the water.88 This
gave rise to a "dog-in-the-manger" charge against riparians8 9 A
need for a present use of the water has now become a require-
ment of suit in most states. The "reasonable use"'" doctrine has
been the answer in some states to the "dog-in-the-manger" and
"monoply charges. 2 It is said to be a third system. 3 And some
think " * * there now seems to be a tendency among all western
states for gradually developing one broad theory of water law
directed toward development and beneficial use."94 This results
88 Teass, Water and Water Courses-Riparian Rights-Diversion of Storm or Flood
Waters for Use on Nonriparian Land, 33 VA. L. REv. 223, 236 (1932).
89 United States v. Gerlack Live Stock., 339 U.S. 739; 70 Sup. CT. REP. 955, 969
(1950) ; Orr Ewing v. Colguhoun, 2 App. Cas. (1876-77) 839; Wiel, Fifty Years of
Water Law, 50 HARV. L. REV. 252, 264 (1936).
90 Hildebrand, The Rights of Riparians at Common Law in Texas, 6 TExAs L. REv.
19,27 (1927).
91 United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., supra note 93 at p. 969:
" * * It is true that commonly riparian possessors have prior rights of use or for
the benefit of the riparian lands to which the rights pertain. They are not rights of
arbitrary monopoly and do not support an insistence on economic waste. Therefore
the extent of the priority of the riparian possessors as against competing subsequent non-
riparian rights of use is properly determinable by reference to the possibility of use
on or benefit to the riparian lands," Bingham, The California Law of Riparian Rights.
LEGAL ESSAYS, p. 11.
92 Treadwell, Developing a New Philosophy of Water Rights, 38 CALIF. L. REV.
572 (1950).
98 Maloney, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine in the Southeastern States, 5
S.C.L.Q. 170. See also authorities cited supra note 67.
94 Busby, American Water Rights Law, 5 S.C.L.Q. 106, 123 (1952). Probably the
most extreme statement of this position to be found is as follows:
"The western states, starting from various starting points, riparian rights or prior-
appropriation, with different conceptions of what each meant, plus different views as
to original federal or state title, with constantly occurring crosses and grafts, with
similar legislative and constitutional provisions meeting different fates and construc-
tions from courts having behind them different water histories and concepts, have
arrived at what at first blush appears to be a hodge-podge in their water law. But the
hodge-podge, if examined with the proper astigmatic glasses, assumes a definite order-
ing. All the states are in transition from various forms of extreme individualism and
vested property rights of substance in water to the same goal, the economic distribution
of state-granted conditional privileges of user. * * *"
"Necessity has led to * * * increase in the control exercised by the public authori-
ties. This change has been so gradual that the legislatures of Wyoming and Nebraska
* * * in effect have abandoned the doctrine of prior-appropriation, although retaining
the words in their statutes * * *. The right acquired is not governed by the state
authorities * 0. Public supervision is manifest in the other arid states and it seems
only a question of time when the doctrine of prior-appropriation will give way to com-
plete public supervision." Lasky, Irrigation Administration, 1 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 161,
162, 172 (1929).
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from recognizing that all property rights are relative and not abso-
lute and that "In the progress of civilization everyone must con-
sider what will be the effect of his act upon his neighbor."95 It is
also said that, "There has never been any essential conflict in the
public interest between the use of water on riparian or non-riparian
lands. For otherwise equal conditions, each such use has equal
public benefits. The opposition to the riparian doctrine, which
finally forced its control, was the ability of riparian owners to
prevent beneficial uses by others while maintaining wasteful uses
themselves.""6
Of course, this diminishes the priority aspect of the various
property rights. In 1925 Wiel said:
Regulation of streams when the users are numerous cannot be made
by mechanical division according to past data. It is a matter of adjusting
present daily needs of many people to conditions that are constantly
changing. The contention for finality in these determinations (adminis-
trative hearings) will probably decline as the results are found to fall
short of what was promised, because the contention promised too much.
It sought to reduce the matter to the civil engineering ideal of a fixed
formula, a course to which the matter is not adaptable. Just as it is said
that specialization of living organisms is the first step toward extinction,
so it is probably no mistake to say that the movement to restore rigidity
to priorities has taken the step that will eventually lessen priority as
a controlling factor. The title determinations are after all not an end
in themselves, and are only incidental to regulation.97
For these and many other reasons, the rationing of the use of
water9" itself and the use of the power which can be generated
in the loss of head have been a constant controversy characterized
by frequent and bitter litigation.99
95 Burch, Conflicting Interests of States over Interstate Waters, 10 TFNN. L. REV.
267, 280 (1932).
96 Harding, Background of California Water and Power Problems, 38 CALI. L
REv. 547, 553 (1950).
97 Wiel, Administrative Finality, 38 HARV. L. REv. 447, 478 (1925).
ss Kuder, Federal and Local Electric Power in the Central Valley-Coordination
or Duplication?, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 638 (1950).
s9 In 1885, Wm. C. Hall, State Engineer of California, began his official report(Irrigation Development) with the following paragraph:
"California has been the scene of an independent development of irrigation practice,
laws, and customs. In some respects the outcome has not been satisfactory to her citizens.
The irrigation interest has been crowded, and the legislature has been embarrassed
by a multitude of perplexing questions and .conflicting measures. We have seen much
progress; but how much more might there have been had the waters of this state been
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The foregoing survey makes it apparent that the complicating
factors in the development of an adequate system of water law
are many and that the solutions are as diverse as the nature of the
interests to be served. It is also apparent that the form of the
problem is not a constant one but rather one that changes with the
growth of population and the technological and industrial progress
of our times. And, finally, it is apparent that it is a problem
which has wider implications than those involved in a particular
lawsuit and which requires a study and perspective broader than
can be had within the limitations imposed by a single lawsuit
developed under our technical rules of evidence.
Thus it would seem to follow that an agency exercising control
over our water supply needs an informed, statewide perspective.
It must be operated within a legal system containing enough flexi-
bility and adaptability to enable it to adjust to, and cope with,
the slowly, but always changing, physical, social, and economic
base with which it deals. We repeat then that it shall be our pur-
pose later to re-examine the water rights inherent in Spanish
and Mexican grants, to label as such that part of the conclusions
of Motl v. Boyd which are dicta and to determine the areas which
are still open for consideration by the legislature and the courts.
utilized under a wise system from the beginning of her growth. Without doubt thousands
of most desirable settlers have been kept away by current reports of water-right and
irrigation litigation. Without doubt many millions of capital have been diverted to other
channels, which under settled conditions, would have been devoted to the development
of local agricultural interests."
He then concluded:
"Varied and many as were the questions thus brought about, they were few and
simple as compared to the propositions which were made for their solution." HALL.,
IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT, pp. 5-6 (1886).
One response to Hall's report was the abolition of his office by the Legislature in
1889. CALIF. STAT. (1889), p. 328.
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